We recommend that you carefully review the contents of the generated .env filesbefore you deploy your functions or check the .env files into source control. Ifany values are sensitive and should not be leaked, remove them from your .envfiles and store them securely inSecret Manager instead.
Contrary to the DVD CSS, which was definitely compromised once the unique encryption key had been discovered, Blu-ray uses stronger DRM mechanisms, which makes it a lot more difficult to manage. Firstly, the AACS standard uses a lot more complicated cryptographic process to protect the disc content, but also allows the industry to revoke compromised keys and distribute new keys through new discs. Secondly, Blu-ray may also use another layer of protection: BD+. Although most of commercial discs use AACS, a few of them additionally use BD+. In 2007, the AACS system was compromised and decryption keys were published on the Internet. Many decryption programs were made available, but the interest to Linux users was the capability of playing their discs - legally purchased - on their computers. Although the industry was able to revoke the first leaked decryption keys, new keys are regularly published in a cat and mouse play.
This is part of the AACS protection scheme: editors are able to revoke old software player host keys that have leaked on the Internet and distribute the lists on newer commercial disc releases. This is irreversible and cannot be fixed even after reflashing the drive. The only two ways to correct this would be:
Here you will put in the information to where the route needs to get leaked to. Route leaking in this case is from the ext VRF to the ACI Tenant VRF. The route to be leaked is the lan prefix of the external site, which in this case is 100.127.1.0/24Figure 48: Leak prefix from ext VRF to user Tenant VRF
Here you will put in the information to where the route needs to get leaked to. Route leaking in this case is from the Tenant VRF to the ACI Cloud CSR external VRF. The route to be leaked in this case is 10.140.3.0/24Figure 53: Leaking 10.140.3.0/24 to the external Cloud ACI CSR external VRFs
BlackCat (aka ALPHV) is a ransomware family that surfaced in mid-November 2021 and quickly gained notoriety for its sophistication and innovation. Operating a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) business model, BlackCat was observed soliciting for affiliates in known cybercrime forums, offering to allow affiliates to leverage the ransomware and keep 80-90% of the ransom payment. The remainder would be paid to the BlackCat author.
Unit 42 has observed BlackCat affiliates asking for ransom amounts of up to $14 million, though they offered to discount this demand to $9 million if paid before the established time. Interestingly, the ransom demand gives the victim the option to pay not only in Bitcoin (the most common option) but also in Monero.
In some cases, BlackCat operators use the chat to threaten the victim, claiming they will perform a DDoS attack on the victims' infrastructure if the ransom is not paid. When it appears in addition to the use of a leak site, this practice is known as triple extortion, a tactic that was observed being used by groups like Avaddon and Suncrypt in the past.
From our analysis, some parts of the code seemed to be based on, and share several similarities with the Conti ransomware builder that was leaked in March 2022. For example, the enumeration of the encryption modes shares the same integer for both Mimic and Conti.
While the situation is indeed unpleasant for the group (they are also being mocked by other threat actors for paying $50,000 for bug bounty, but not paying a developer), the fact that no source has been leaked allows LockBit to adapt to the situation.
You can name this anything you want, have any extension you want, and place it anywhere as well, e.g: config.ini, config/secrets.cfg. If you manage multiple instances you could create separate config files for each instance containing the different URLs and any tokens you need access to. In the event that a config file may be leaked or exposed, it will be isolated to that one file.
Using the same password for more than one service may leave those accounts vulnerable to a credential-stuffing attack. If a service is breached and passwords are leaked, attackers may try the same credentials on other services to compromise additional accounts.
One place you would need to be careful is that sharing your entire .git folder would include .git/config. Depending on what you've done, this could have very little information, or quite a lot. If all you've done is a clone, there won't be much more than your list of remotes. If you've worked extensively in the repository, however, there might be things like aliases or configuration settings, as well as a partial record of what branches you've pushed (more specifically, what tracking branches you have configured). Worse, if you've set up any access credentials (e.g. for code review or CI) that are stored in the local .git/config, those would be leaked.
Your command history won't be directly leaked. However, it may be possible to infer your command history, at least as far as (some) git commands, via careful analysis of the contents of the .git folder. Note that this is partly true for public repositories as well, although it is much harder to impossible there to uncover anything other than commits and merges. The difference mainly comes down to your .git folder will contain artifacts from commits that have been amended, rebases, abandoned branches, and so forth. 59ce067264